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Demographic Change and Regional Labour 





Demographic change will be one of the most challenging issues for industrialized economies 
in the decades to come. In this paper, we focus on the impact of demographic change on 
labour markets. By setting up a stylized model of a regional labour market, we are able to 
analyze the interaction of labour demand and supply during demographic transitions. The 
simulation results for eastern Germany, a forerunner in the demographic process, show that 
the population decline will not help to reduce the currently high unemployment among the 
low-skilled dramatically. Among the high-skilled, scarcities will play a major role and could 
impede the development of industrial centers. 
JEL Code: J1, J2, R1. 
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1. Introduction
* 
Demographic change will be one of the most challenging issues for industrialized economies 
in the decades to come. While population has been increasing since World War II, population 
will decline in most countries around 2030. Moreover, as the population is ageing at the same 
time, the decline in the working age population will even be more pronounced and thus affect 
labour markets in a considerable way. This is our starting point. We focus on the impact of 
demographic change on labour markets – a much neglected issue in our view.  
To study the subject we take eastern Germany as a laboratory example as eastern 
Germany is a forerunner in the demographic process. The shrinkage and ageing of the 
population has already started and will proceed much quicker than in most other industrialized 
regions. The population is expected to decline by 7.3 percent from 2005 until 2020. The 
working age population will even shrink by 16.5 percent. Eastern Germany is also a suitable 
laboratory in terms of unemployment. Unemployment figures have remained around 20 
percent in many regions for the last decade with large differences with regard to the workers’ 
skill levels. 
How will labour markets react to the onset of demographic decline? On the one hand, 
the shrinking of the labour force could be a boon for the economies currently suffering from 
high unemployment. On the other hand, skilled-labour will become scarcer, thus putting the 
skill-intensive industries of the industrialized economies at a disadvantage. Furthermore, local 
demand of non-traded goods will decrease due to the shrinkage of the population. The latter 
effect reduces the total demand for labour. Thus, the net effect of demographic change on 
labour markets is far from obvious. Will unemployment figures go down? Will some skills 
                                                 
* This paper is part of the CESifo project on “How to Construct Europe”. We thank Alessandra Casarico, 
Stephan Rudolph, Michael Stimmelmayr, seminar participants at the CESifo Area Conference on Employment 
and Social Protection and at the Max-Planck-Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock. 3 
become scarce in the near future? Will local markets have to shrink due to decline in 
population?  
We try to highlight some of these issues by setting up a stylized model of a regional 
labour market that is exposed to demographic change. The model is constructed as a 
computable general equilibrium model with rationing in the labour market. We view eastern 
Germany as a small open economy that partly produces goods for a large world market but 
also provides non-traded goods and services to the local population. Production requires the 
input of different types of skilled and unskilled labour which initially face differing risks of 
unemployment. Demographic change will have an effect on both the supply side and the 
demand side of labour markets. The supply of labour will be reduced potentially leading to 
lower unemployment of the low-skilled but also creating the risk of scarcities among the high-
skilled. On the demand side, the shrinkage of the population will create lower demands for 
locally provided goods and services, thus leading to a contraction of the local labour market. 
Overall, the findings of our simulations are the following. Demographic change will not 
help to reduce the high unemployment among the low-skilled dramatically. Unemployment 
will decrease only slowly. Among the high-skilled, scarcities will play a major role and could 
impede the development of the labour market. Due to complementarity effects, this scarcity 
may even spill over other skill groups preventing a significant decline of the unemployment 
rate among the medium-skilled workers. 
We admit that our approach is to some extent speculative. Labour markets are exposed 
to many unpredictable shocks and they adopt to these changes with unforeseen innovations. 
Nevertheless, it may be very helpful to have projections based on the current state of 
information. The best we can do is to carry out status quo projections on the development of 
labour markets that are exposed to demographic shocks.  
Our paper introduces two main innovations into the literature on the economics of 
demographic change. Firstly, it deals with labour markets whereas most of the literature so far 4 
has focussed on capital markets [e.g., Abel (2001), Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2002), 
Krueger and Ludwig (in press), Poterba (2001, 2004)] or public pension schemes [e.g., 
Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau (2001), Demange and Laroque (1999), Fehr (2000)]. To our 
knowledge, Börsch-Supan (2003) is the only paper dealing explicitly with the consequences 
of a shrinking labour supply. It examines the human capital formation necessary to 
compensate for the impact of demographic ageing on domestic production. Secondly, we 
focus on the regional impact whereas most of the literature has dealt with national 
macroeconomic issues [e.g., Börsch-Supan (2003), Chong-Bum and Jeon (2000), Miles 
(1999)]. In our view, more attention has to be given to the local effects and to the 
microeconomic consequences of demographic change in the future. 
Section 2 provides some important stylized facts about the demographic change and the 
current labour market conditions in eastern Germany. In Section 3, we develop a simple 
general equilibrium model of a (regional) small open economy that uses different skill types 
of labour to produce traded and non-traded goods. Section 4 describes the data used in the 
simulation model. Section 5 contains the simulation results for the eastern German labour 
market and discusses the impact of policy measures. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Stylized Facts  
Most industrialized economies in Europe will face a rapid decline in their populations starting 
around 2030. The United Nations (2004) expects that populations will decrease by 11 percent 
in Italy, by 4 percent in Germany and by 17 percent in Poland up to 2050. Figure 1 shows the 
projected population size for some selected industrialized economies (2000=100).  5 
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Source: United Nations (2004).  
Eastern Germany provides a suitable laboratory for studying the consequences of such a 
drastic and rapid decline in population as the demographic change has already set in. Figure 2 
shows the development of the population size in eastern and western Germany. Whereas the 
West German population will remain roughly constant until 2020, eastern Germany will loose 
7 percent of its population. This development goes along with an ageing of the population. 
The average age of the East German population will rise by 5 years – increasing from 
currently 44 years to 49 years.
1  
                                                 
1 Note that the population projection of  the United Nations differs from the German Federal Statistical Office 
due to different assumptions on migration and  fertility. In the following analysis we use variant 5 of  the 10
th  
co-ordinated population projection of the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2003). 6 
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Sources: Federal Statistical Office Germany (2003) 
It is important to point out that – contrary to conventional wisdom – the major driving force 
behind the declining population is not migration but low fertility. With the exception of the 
years around German unification, natural population movements (births minus deaths) have 
been more important in numbers than the outmigration of the eastern German population (see 
Figure 3). 7 
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Sources: Federal Statistical Office Germany 
Fertility in eastern Germany dropped after unification from 1.52 children to an all time low of 
0.77 in 1994. Since then, fertility in eastern Germany has increased again slightly but is still 
somewhat lower than the West German fertility rate which is already among the lowest in 
Western Europe. 
The decline and ageing of the eastern German population also affects the labour market. The 
working age population (15-64) is decreasing even faster than the population as a whole. As 
Figure 2 shows, the working age population will shrink by 16.5 percent from 2005 until 2020. 
Whether the reduction in the labour supply is larger or smaller than the change in the working 
age population is not a trivial question. On the one hand, an increasing share of the population 
is reaching ages with lower labour participation rates; this will even accelerate the shrinkage 
of the labour supply. On the other hand, younger cohorts exhibit higher educational 
attainments. This educational trend may slow down the shrinkage of the labour supply as 
labour market participation increases with skill levels. We will discuss the impact of the 
demographic change on the labour supply in Section 4.  8 
The demographic change will affect an eastern German labour market that is far beyond of 
full-employment equilibrium. The average unemployment rate in eastern Germany amounted 
to 20.6 percent in 2005 showing significant regional differences. The underlying economic 
problems become more clearly visible when one breaks down the unemployment figures 
according to skill levels. Figure 4 depicts the development of the skill-specific unemployment 
rates in eastern and western Germany.
2 The unemployment rates for the high-skilled in 
eastern and western Germany show two things. First, the unemployment rates are low, 
basically around the level of natural unemployment created by job search and matching. 
Secondly, the eastern German unemployment rate is not much higher than the unemployment 
rate in the West. The picture completely changes when we turn to the low-skilled. The 
unemployment rate in western Germany is already at 20 percent but extends to 50 percent in 
eastern Germany. The skill-specific differences in the unemployment rates suggest that the 
driving force is an excessive wage compression. Wages for the low-skilled are far above the 
market clearing levels. The main reason why wages cannot adjust downwards (even in eastern 
Germany where labour unions play no major role) is the implicit minimum wage created by 
the German welfare system. Unemployment benefits and social assistance (ALG II) are more 
or less uniform across the country. This implicit minimum wage is, of course, no impediment 
for the labour market of the high-skilled but it creates major distortions at the bottom of the 
skill distribution. There are too few low-skilled jobs that are sufficiently productive to warrant 
wages above the implicit minimum wage.  
As the differences in the unemployment risks are so large, we will have to take the differences 
in the labour market conditions for the skill groups into account when we set up our 
simulation model. 
                                                 
2 The German labour office classifies all individuals without any vocational training as low-skilled. People with 
vocational training are counted as medium-skilled, and a university diploma qualifies for being high-skilled. 
Unfortunately, this classification is rather crude as the medium-skilled account for 67 percent of the labour force. 
16 percent of the labour force are low-skilled and 17 percent are high-skilled. 9 
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Source: Reinberg and Hummel (2005). 
3. A Simple General Equilibrium Model 
We view eastern Germany as a small open economy. Production takes place in two sectors. 
The traded sector produces a good that is competitively supplied in the world market. The 
price of the good is normalized to unity. In this sector, demographic change has only an 
impact on the supply side, e.g. due to a shortage of skilled workers, but not on the demand 
side which is exogenously given by the world market. The second sector produces a non-
traded good for the domestic population. The price p is endogenously determined by the local 
demand and supply conditions.  
Each sector consists of many competitive firms employing three types of labour: low-skilled 
(L), medium-skilled (M) and high-skilled (H). The production function exhibits the usual 10 
standard properties and is denoted by  ) , , ( i i i
j
i H M L f  for firm i with j = T, N for the traded 
and non-traded sector, respectively. Each firm takes the wage rates 
x w  (x = L, M, H) as given. 
Workers can move between the sectors so that wages are the same in the traded and non-
traded sector for each skill group. Firms maximize their profits  
∑
=
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T p ). The profit-maximizing labour input is given by equalizing marginal 
productivity with (real) wages: 
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Hence, total labour demand for workers of skill group k is given by 
) , , , ( ) , , (
, , p w w w x w w w x x
H M L D N H M L D T D + =  where 
D j x
, is the labour demand in sector j 
derived from (1). As the amount of labour employed cannot exceed the supply, we have the 
following set of macroeconomic restrictions  
H M L x x p w w w x
H M L D , , ) , , , ( = ∀ ≤  (2) 
where  x  denotes the (exogenous) labour supply for skill-group x. This labour supply will 
change over time in the process of demographic change (see the next section for detailed 
information on the development of labour supply). With respect to the adjustment process in 
the labour market, we assume that there is downward wage rigidity. Wages can be set above 
market clearing levels, e.g., as a result of (implicit) minimum wages.
3 Unemployment per se 
will not lead to an adjustment of wages. If demand exceeds supply for a specific skill group, 
however, wages can adjust upwards to market clearing levels. 
                                                 
3 In Germany, the implicit minimum wage is determined by the level of social transfers. Social assistance defines 
a minimum wage below which hardly any labour is supplied. We assume throughout the paper that this implicit 
minimum wage is exogenously given. 11 
The model is closed by determining the price in the non-traded sector. We assume that a 
constant share γ of local disposable income is spent on the non-traded good. Disposable 
income amounts to  Z x w t
H M L x
D x + ⋅ ⋅ − ∑
= , ,
) 1 ( w h e r e  t is the tax rate on labour income and Z are 
transfers (pensions, unemployment benefits …) to the local population. We will specify Z in 
more detail when we come to the simulation of the model. The amount spent on non-traded 
goods has to be equal to the value of non-traded goods produced in the region: 
) , , ( ) 1 (
, ,
D D D N
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Equations (2) and (3) determine simultaneously the equilibrium prices and quantities. When 
the domestic labour force shrinks due to the demographic change, one or several of the 
inequalities in equation (2) may become binding. This may reduce the unemployment in the 
region but can also trigger wage adjustments when some skills become scarce. 
4. Labour Force Projection 
For the projection of the workforce in eastern Germany, we mainly use two data sets from the 
Federal Statistical Office: the population projection and the German Micro Census. The latter 
data set provides information on the skill-level of the workforce as well as on the employment 
status according to skill and age groups [Federal Statistical Office (2004)]. In addition, 
information on sectoral employment is given so that employees can be assigned to the 
tradable and non-tradable sector.
4 For the population projection, we use the variant 5 of the 
10
th co-ordinated population projection [Federal Statistical Office (2003)]. This projection is 
based on the population statistics of the year 2001, with the projection starting for the year 
2002. Population projections are available for all German federal states until the year 2050 
and they are differentiated by age and gender.  
                                                 
4 See Appendix A for the classification of the industries into the tradable and non-tradable sectors. 12 
We will need a projection of the labour supply up to 2020 as a key ingredient for the 
simulation model in Section 5. This projection will be based on the population forecast and on 
projections of: 1) the skill composition of the population by age and gender, and 2) labour 
participation. To determine the future skill composition of the population, we assume that all 
future cohorts mimic the educational choices of the current population aged 30 to 34. We use 
the age group 30 to 34 as a reference group as this cohort has already completed its formal 
education. Changes in the educational attainment beyond the age of 35 are fairly rare. The 
skill composition of the population aged 35 years and older shows age and gender specific 
differences: Men above the age of 45 are more high-skilled than women of the same age (see 
Table 1). Younger women display higher educational achievements than the older female 
workforce. 



















15 – 19    4 %    1 %    0 %  96 %    3 %    1 %    0 %  96 % 
20 – 24  16 %  45 %    1 %  39 %  12 %  39 %    2 %  47 % 
25 – 29  13 %  65 %    8 %  13 %  12 %  65 %  11 %  12 % 
30 – 34  10 %  72 %  17 %  -    8 %  73 %  18 %  - 
35 – 39    8 %  75 %  16 %  -    8 %  76 %  16 %  - 
40 – 44    7 %  78 %  15 %  -    7 %  78 %  16 %  - 
45 – 49    7 %  75 %  18 %  -    8 %  76 %  16 %  - 
50 – 54    6 %  73 %  20 %  -    9 %  76 %  15 %  - 
55 – 59    6 %  72 %  22 %  -  12 %  75 %  13 %  - 
60 – 64    7 %  73 %  20 %  -  14 %  77 %    9 %  - 
Source: own calculations based on Federal Statistical Office (2004). 
With respect to labour participation, we assume that the age specific labour force participation 
rates for each skill group remain constant over time. The participation rates in eastern 
Germany show three typical features: 1) labour supply is hump-shaped in age, 2) participation 13 
increases with skill level, and 3) male participation rates are higher than female participation 
rates (see Table 2).   
Table 2: Participation Rates by Age and Gender in Eastern Germany (2003) 
Men Women 













15 – 19  81.6 %  90.3 %    64.1 %  79.7 %   
20 – 24  90.9 %  95.4 %  72.8 %  68.1 %  87.1 %  79.9 % 
25 – 29  89.7 %  94.3 %  90.4 %  65.9 %  88.4 %  86.5 % 
30 – 34  91.7 %  97.4 %  95.5 %  65.2 %  92.4 %  92.9 % 
35 – 39  88.4 %  97.4 %  98.8 %  77.0 %  93.5 %  93.3 % 
40 – 44  88.7 %  96.3 %  98.1 %  76.8 %  94.9 %  95.8 % 
45 – 49  86.7 %  95.7 %  98.7 %  78.6 %  92.4 %  97.5 % 
50 – 54  79.7 %  92.5 %  96.5 %  73.2 %  89.5 %  94.3 % 
55 – 59  72.9 %  84.6 %  94.0 %  63.8 %  81.1 %  89.8 % 
60 – 64  23.3 %  35.5 %  62.5 %  13.5 %  22.6 %  47.0 % 
Source: own calculations based on Federal Statistical Office (2004). 
Combining the projection of the population forecast by qualification and the skill specific 
labour force participation, we obtain the labour force projection according to skill groups 
(Figure 5). There will be a reduction in the number of low-skilled up to 2020 (- 15.4 percent). 
The medium-skilled labour force will experience shrinkage of 15.1 percent with most of the 
reduction setting in after 2010. Due to the slightly higher educational attainment of younger 
cohorts, the group of the high-skilled will shrink somewhat slower than the two other skill 
groups (- 11.6 percent). In Section 5.4, we will discuss policy measures which lead to 
alternative labour supplies of the high-skilled. 14 
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Source: own calculations. 
5. Simulation 
We first specify the production function, which is used for simulating the consequences of the 
demographic change. In a second step, the simulation model is calibrated to reflect the current 
situation in the eastern German labour market. In Section 5.3, a baseline simulation is 
conducted which will serve as our benchmark case. This section also contains a sensitivity 
analysis to evaluate the impact of alternative exogenous wages on the simulation results. 
Finally, we simulate several policy measures that aim at increasing the size of the high-skilled 
work force in eastern Germany. 
5.1 Specification of the Production Function 
For simulating the effects of the demographic change in eastern Germany, a production 
function has to be specified for the general equilibrium model developed in Section 3. In 
particular, the current and future labour demands in each sector (tradable and non-tradable) 15 
have to be simulated for the three skill groups. To allow for substitutability and 
complementarity between different skill groups, the functional form of the production 
function has to be very flexible [Hamermesh (1993), Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004)].  
We have chosen the translog production function as it satisfies all requirements for our 
simulation model. Due to its flexibility, it has been extensively used in previous empirical 
investigations.
5 For instance, Fitzenberger and Franz (1998) show that for Germany a translog 
specification adequately describes the functional relationship between labour as well as 
capital inputs on the one hand and output on the other hand.  
Assuming Hicks-neutral technical change, the translog production function is specified in the 
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In addition to the factors discussed in Section 3, we have explicitly included fixed capital (K) 
in the production function. This production function has now to be specified for the traded 
and non-traded sector.  
                                                 
5 See Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1973) as well as Boisvert (1982) for a detailed discussion of the translog 
function 16 
5.2 Calibration of the model 
In order to simulate the impact of demographic change on the labour market, the model has to 
capture the current situation of the eastern German labour market. We specify the exogenous 
parameters of the production function so that the number of employees in each of the two 
sectors is replicated by the model in the base year. 
The parameter values of the production function are based on the estimates by Fitzenberger 
and Franz (1998); see Appendix B for the parameter values. The parameters define the 
substitution and complementarity relationships between the input factors, i.e. between the 
three skill levels of labour as well as between labour and capital.  
In determining the wage structure in eastern Germany, we calculate skill-specific gross wages 
from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). The remuneration is skill specific but not 
sector specific, i.e. employees with the same skill level receive the same wage in all 
branches.
6 Whereas wages are considered as exogenous in the calibration of the model, they 
are determined endogenously as soon as there is a bottleneck in a skill specific labour market 
segment. We assume that skill specific wages will rise as soon as the unemployment rate in a 
specific labour market segment hits a threshold level which is set to an unemployment rate of 
3 percent in our baseline scenario. This is a simple but appropriate way to model the stylized 
fact of downward rigid wages in Germany. With regard to the transfers (Z) as well as the tax 
rate (t) we use official data from the German Pension Insurance (2006) and the Federal 
Statistical Office (2005). 
5.3 Baseline Scenario 
In the baseline scenario, we assume that the wages of all skill groups rise with the exogenous 
total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the period 2005 - 2020 as long as the unemployment 
                                                 
6 In a recent paper Lee und Wolpin (2006) analyze the inter-sectoral mobility of workers between the service 
sector and the production sector in the United States. The authors find that relative wages in the production and 17 
rate exceeds the critical level (3 percent). Hence, the baseline model reflects changes in labour 
demand that are purely due to demographic changes but do not capture any relative changes in 
input prices, i.e. increases or decreases in skill-specific wages. Labour demand will develop 
differently in the two sectors. In the tradable sector – where the international demand for 
goods eventually determines the demand for workers – the amount of labour demanded will 
remain constant. In contrast, labour demand decreases in the non-tradable sector due to the 
overall decline in the demand for local goods which in turn is the result of the shrinking 
population in eastern Germany. The number of employees with medium skill levels will 
display a decline by 8.8 percent within the period 2005-2020. The decrease is even somewhat 
more pronounced within the other skill groups, i.e. 9.4 percent and 9.5 percent for the low-
skilled and high-skilled, respectively. In addition to the decline in the number of employees, 
we compute the decline in the number of the skill specific labour force (Figure 6). Overall we 
find that the reduction in the labour force is stronger than the decline in the number of 
employees.  
                                                                                                                                                          
service sector in the United States remained constant over time which is consistent with wage arbitrage between 
sectors. 18 
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Source: own calculations. 19 
For high-skilled workers we find a bottleneck around the year 2013 when, the unemployment 
rate would fall below the 3 percent level which we define as the critical level for labour 
shortage. Without wage adjustments, labour demand would exceed labour supply by 20 
thousand high-skilled workers in the year 2014 and by 90 thousand in the year 2020. The 
scarcity of high-skilled labour will drive up wages. According to our simulation, wages will 
increase on average by roughly 6 percent p.a. in the period 2013 to 2020 thus leading to 
significantly more income inequality (see Appendix C for the development of wages).
7  
Hence, from the year 2013 onward the unemployment rate remains at the 3 percent level 
which is captured by the parallel curves in Figure 6 (employed high-skilled and high-skilled 
labour force). 
Note, however, that such a strong increase in wages for the high-skilled will necessarily lead 
to an additional inflow of workers (or an outflow of firms). Hence, the simulation result may 
also be used to question the reliability of the assumption in the population projections. 
With regard to the low- and medium-skilled, labour supply will decrease as well. However, 
due to the high number of unemployed persons, there will be no shortage of low- and/or 
medium-skilled workers in the projection period. Unemployment among medium-skilled and 
low-skilled workers will decline by 5 and 6 percentage points, respectively. Overall total 
employment in eastern Germany will decline by 600 thousand workers, i.e. from 6.7 to 6.1 
million.  
Identifying the Transmission Channels 
Our results so far indicate that the scarcity of high-skilled labour may play a significant role in 
eastern German labour markets. At the same time, the high unemployment among low- and 
medium-skilled workers persists. Total employment among the low- and medium-skilled will 
                                                 
7 Note that such large changes in relative wages would not only trigger an inflow of additional high-skilled 
workers but also lead to skill upgrading in the long run as the skill premium rises. 20 
even decrease towards the end of our simulation period. In this section, we will try to identify 
the transmission channels for this decline in employment. There are two possible causes for 
declining employment. First, a decline in the local demand for non-traded goods could force 
the producers of these goods to demand fewer workers. Secondly, complementarity of high- 
and medium-skilled workers with the high-skilled may be responsible for the declining 
demand. Due to the demographic change, fewer high-skilled workers are employed in the 
traded and non-traded sectors. When low- and medium-skilled workers are complements in 
the production process, the scarcity of high-skilled will spill over to the other labour market 
segments. 
To single out the magnitude of these two effects, we conduct the following thought 
experiment. Suppose that any additional labour demand is met by high-skilled workers from 
outside eastern Germany once high-skilled labour becomes scarce. Hence, the labour supply 
of the high-skilled is infinitely elastic at the current wage. However, the additional income of 
these (imported) workers is not spent locally. The additional workers do not contribute to the 
local demand for non-traded goods. Figure 7 shows the labour demand for medium- and low-
skilled workers with and without the additional labour supply. The simulation results show 
that the driving force behind the decline in employment is the complementarity with the high-
skilled workers (difference between black and grey bars). The inflow of additional workers 
helps to stabilize the demand for medium and low skills. Only a small fraction of the total 
decline can be attributed to the shrinking demand for non-traded goods (difference between 
black horizontal line and black bars). 21 
Figure 7: Labour Demand for Low- and Medium-skilled Workers with and without 
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 22 
Sensitivity Analysis 
In addition to the baseline scenario, we carry out the simulations with an alternative 
development of wages. The baseline scenario assumes that wages grow with total factor 
productivity as long as there is no scarcity within a skill group. This is, for instance, 
compatible with union wage bargaining where unions claim productivity gains for their 
clientele. In the alternative scenario, we assume that wages remain constant as long as 
unemployment exceeds the 3 percent threshold. 
Our simulation results prove to be quite robust since the bottleneck for the high-skilled only 
varies slightly (+/- two years). Constant wages lead to higher employment levels in all skill 
groups. Compared to the baseline scenario, there are 20 thousand more high-skilled, 54 
thousand more medium-skilled and 6 thousand more low-skilled workers in the year 2013. 
However, since the bottleneck of the high-skilled is only deferred for two years (2015), skill-
specific employment levels will converge to those of the baseline scenario until the end of the 
projection period.  
To summarize, demographic change will not solve the labour market problems in eastern 
Germany as the unemployment rates among the low-skilled will decrease only slowly. Among 
the high-skilled, scarcities could play an important role impeding the decline in total 
unemployment. 
5.4 Policy Measures 
The baseline scenario shows a scarcity of high-skilled after 2013. This raises the question to 
what extent the eastern German states will be able to satisfy the excess demand from internal 
sources (i.e. without additional migration beyond the assumptions of the population 
projection). We consider three alternative sources for additional labour supply of high-skilled 
workers: 1) female labour participation, 2) increased participation rates among older workers, 
3) increasing the share of high-skilled through education. For all three policy options, we 23 
simulate a realistic scenario to evaluate the magnitude of the effects. See Table 3 for a survey 
of the effects on the labour supply of the high-skilled and Figure 8 for the associated 
additional employment of low- and medium-skilled workers. 
Table 3: Alternative Labour Force Scenarios 
    2010 2015 2020 
Women  Participation rate (baseline)  88.7 %  86.2 %  86.3 % 
  Participation rate (alternative)  89.7 %  88.7 %  88.8 % 
  Δ high-skilled labour supply  +7,600 / +0.6 %  +17,600 / +1.4 %  +16,900 / +1.4 % 
       
Older Workers  Participation rate 55-59 years 
(baseline)  
90.4  % 90.2% 89.9  % 
 
Participation rate 55-59 years 
(alternative)  
92.6  % 94.7% 94.5  % 
  Δ high-skilled labour supply  +4,900 / +2,4 %  +9,000 / +5.0 %  +10,300 / +5.2 % 
 
Participation rate 60-64 years 
(baseline)  
58.3 %  54.8 %  54.6 % 
 
Participation rate 60-64 years 
(alternative ) 
62.5 %  63.9 %  63.7 % 
  Δ high-skilled labour supply  +6,800 / +7.0 %  +19,600 / +16.6 %  +17,800 / +16.7 %
       
Education  Share of high-skilled baseline   16.0 %  16.5 %  16.6 % 
  Share of high-skilled alternative  16.3 %  17.3 %  17.8 % 
  Δ high-skilled labour supply  +20,800 / +1,6 %  +59,200 / +4.6 %  +85,700 / +7.1 % 
Source: own calculations. 
Female Labour Participation 
A comparison of gender-specific participation rates shows that women are less integrated in 
the labour market than men (see Table 2). Increasing female labour force participation is one 
of the most prominent (and disputed) policy goals in Germany. For the policy experiment, we 
assume that the difference in participation rates between high-skilled men and women will be 
reduced by 50 percent up to the year 2015. Since we want to isolate the effect of higher labour 
supply of high-skilled women, the labour force participation of low- and medium-skilled 
women remains constant. The total high-skilled labour force will be higher by 1.4 percent in 
the year 2020 compared to the baseline scenario.  24 
As our simulation results show the impact of higher female labour participation on high-
skilled labour market in eastern Germany is fairly small. This is due to the already (relatively) 
high labour force participation of high-skilled women in eastern Germany. Higher female 
labour force participation shifts the constraint in high-skilled labour by two years. Labour 
demand for high-skilled reaches the 3 percent constraint in unemployment now by 2015 
(instead of 2013). The additional employment also spills over to the other two labour market 
segments. In 2020, there will be additional employment of 70,000 and 8,000 for the medium-
and low-skilled, respectively.  
Higher Labour Participation among Older Workers 
We modify the participation rates of older workers, i.e. men and women aged 55 and above. 
Compared to other European countries, the age group 55 years and older displays relatively 
low participation rates in eastern Germany. Table 4 shows the eastern German participation 
rates of the population aged 55 to 64 in comparison to the Swedish ones. While 83 percent of 
the high-skilled men and 87 percent of the high-skilled women aged 55 to 64 years are still 
active in the Swedish labour market, the respective labour force participation in eastern 
Germany amounts to 76 percent and 69 percent only. In our policy simulation, we analyse an 
increase of the participation rates for the population aged 55-64. In particular, we assume that 
the differences to the Swedish labour force participation (see Table 4) will halve by 2015.  





Germany  Sweden  Δ  
Eastern 
Germany  Sweden  Δ  
Low-skilled  47.9 %  69.4 %  21.5 %-points  36.4 %  63.2 %  26.8 %-points 
Medium-skilled  59.4 %  81.1 %  21.7 %-points  50.3 %  76.6 %  26.3 %-points 
High-skilled  76.3 %  83.2 %    6.9 %-points  68.7 %  87.2 %  18.6 %-points 
Source: Statistics Sweden (2006), own calculations. 25 
Higher participation rates of older workers imply an increase in the high-skilled labour force 
by 2.3 percent. An increase in the participation rates of older workers entails a postponement 
in the shortage of high-skilled workers by three years to the year 2016. Compared to the 
scenario with female labour participation, the potential for additional high-skilled workers is 
much larger for two reasons. First, the possible change in participation rates is much larger, 
and second a growing share of the population will reach the age group 55-64 as society ages.  
Due to the complementarity of skills, the increase in labour supply among older high-skilled 
workers also has an impact on the medium-skilled and low-skilled labour force. All in all, 
employment in these two skill groups will rise by 115,000 and 12,000, respectively, when 
compared to the baseline scenario. 
Higher Education 
In this scenario, we assume that the share of the high-skilled among the young labour force 
will increase from currently 16 percent to 20 percent up to the year 2015. This increase in the 
education of the high-skilled may be due to higher university enrolment rates as a 
consequence of promotion of tertiary education. The high-skilled labour force will increase by 
7.1 percent up to 2020. Since we assume that the additional high-skilled are exclusively 
drawn from the medium-skilled group, the medium-skilled labour force will shrink by 1.9 
percent while the low-skilled labour force remains constant.  
We find that the increase in higher education significantly improves the labour market 
situation in eastern Germany. The bottleneck of highly qualified workers is shifting to the 
year 2019, i.e. six years later compared to the baseline scenario. Since the education policy 
shifts workers from medium to high skills, this policy has also a direct impact on the labour 
market for the medium-skilled. According to our simulation results low-skilled 
unemployment could shrink by almost by 100 thousand individuals by 2005 whereas the 
decrease would amount to 900 thousand persons in the group of the medium-skilled. The total 26 
number of high-skilled employees would decline by 3.1 percent in the period 2005-2020. 
Hence, if it is possible to enhance the number of the highly qualified, the entire labour market 
in eastern Germany would benefit from this development. 
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6. Conclusion 
Eastern Germany is a forerunner in the demographic change that will be experienced in many 
countries throughout Europe in the decades ahead. In this paper, we use eastern Germany as a 
laboratory for the impact of demographic change on labour markets. The current situation 
provides an interesting setting. There is high unemployment among the low-skilled. At the 
same time, firms are experiencing (local) shortages of high-skilled labour.  
Our simulation model, which captures the time period up to 2020, shows that there might be a 
bottleneck of high-skilled employees after the year 2013. This shortage could lead to a 
significant increase in the wages of the high-skilled and make it more difficult to find 
appropriate workers in the local labour markets. The wage increase will also lead to rising 
income inequalities as there will be no upward pressure in the other labour market segments. 
The distinction between a tradable and non-tradable sector proves to be decisive since the 
majority of the eastern German labour force is employed in the non-tradable sector. Due to 
the population decline, the lower demand for non-tradable goods will result in a slightly lower 
demand for workers in eastern Germany. The tradable sector will not fully compensate this 
decrease so that the total labour demand in eastern Germany is likely to decrease from 6.7 at 
present to 6.1 million in the year 2020. Since the labour supply will decline more strongly 
than labour demand, total unemployment numbers could decrease. 
The results of the simulation should be interpreted with caution. There are several important 
aspects that have been neglected in the analysis so far. For instance, we ignore possible effects 
of an aging society on the worker productivity. The empirical literature [e.g., Daveri and 
Maliranta (2007), Skirbekk (2003)] has not yet reached a consensus on this topic. 
Furthermore, we exclude possible shifts between the sectors by assuming the same total factor 
productivity growth in the traded and no-traded sectors and by imposing a constant 
expenditure share for non-traded goods. Some of these assumptions should be relaxed in 
future research. 28 
What preliminary policy implications can be drawn from our analysis? The reduction of the 
unemployment rates among the low-skilled seems to be good news at first glance. However, 
one has to take into account that adequate access to high-skilled labour pool is a necessary 
condition for many firms in their location choice. Regions experiencing a dramatic decline in 
its working age population such as eastern Germany could be at a disadvantage in regional 
competition due to the relative shortage of high-skilled labour. Policy measures aiming at an 
increase in the high-skilled labour supply could alleviate the burden. Education and 
immigration policy as well as changes in early retirement policies are obvious examples for 
such measures. 
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Appendix A: Tradable and Non-tradable Sectors 
The following table shows the allocation of the different sectors to the traded and non-traded 
sectors following the classification of Fitzenberger and Franz (1998).  
Tradable Sector  Non-Tradable Sector 
Agriculture and Forestry (A)  Energy supply (E) 
Fishery (B)  Construction (F) 
Mining (C)  Retail (G) 
Manufacturing (D)  Hotel and restaurant industry (H) 
Banking and Insurance (J)  Communications and information transmission (I) 
  Real estate (K) 
 Public  administration  (L) 
 Education  (M) 
  Health and Social system (N) 
  Other public services (O) 
  Private households with personnel (P) 
  Exterritorial organizations / statutory corporations (Q) 
 
Appendix B: Specification of the Translog Production Function  
Parameter  Tradable Sector  Non-Tradable Sector 
A0 17.000  10.000 
aL 0.120  0.165 
aM 0.525  0.475 
aH 0.355  0.360 
bLM -0.071  0.144 
bLH 0.001  0.001 
bLK 0.039  -0.025 
bMH -0.007  -0.070 
bMK -0.068  -0.019 
bHK 0.018  0.041 
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Appendix C: Development of wages for alternative scenarios 












2005  36  44  100 100 100 100 
2006  36  44  100 100 100 100 
2007  36  44  100 100 100 100 
2008  36  44  100 100 100 100 
2009  36  44  100 100 100 100 
2010  36  44  100 100 100 100 
2011  36  44  100 100 100 100 
2012  36  44  100 100 100 100 
2013  36  44  100 100 100 100 
2014  36  44  104 100 100 100 
2015  36  44  108 102 100 100 
2016  36  44  114 107 104 100 
2017  36  44  121 113 110 100 
2018  36  44  131 122 118 100 
2019  36  44  143 133 128 101 
2020  36  44  158 146 140 107 
 CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2257 C.A.E. Goodhart, The Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis, March 2008 
 
2258 Stefan Bauernschuster, Oliver Falck and Stephan Heblich, The Impact of Continuous 
Training on a Firm’s Innovations, March 2008 
 
2259 Michael Grimm and Stephan Klasen, Geography vs. Institutions at the Village Level, 
March 2008 
 
2260 Fwu-Ranq Chang, Property Insurance, Portfolio Selection and their Interdependence, 
March 2008 
 
2261 J. Atsu Amegashie and Marco Runkel, The Paradoxes of Revenge in Conflicts, March 
2008 
 
2262 Hans Jarle Kind, Marko Koethenbuerger and Guttorm Schjelderup, Efficiency 
Enhancing Taxation in Two-sided Markets, March 2008 
 
2263 M. Hashem Pesaran, Til Schuermann and L. Vanessa Smith, Forecasting Economic and 
Financial Variables with Global VARs, March 2008 
 
2264 Volker Grossmann, Entrepreneurial Innovation and Sustained Long-run Growth without 
Weak or Strong Scale Effects, March 2008 
 
2265 Robert S. Chirinko and Huntley Schaller, The Irreversibility Premium, March 2008 
 
2266 Andrea Galeotti and José Luis Moraga-González, Platform Intermediation in a Market 
for Differentiated Products, April 2008 
 
2267 Torben M. Andersen and Michael Svarer, The Role of Workfare in Striking a Balance 
between Incentives and Insurance in the Labour Market, April 2008 
 
2268 Harald Badinger, Cyclical Fiscal Policy, Output Volatility, and Economic Growth, April 
2008 
 
2269 Thomas Aronsson and Erkki Koskela, Outsourcing and Optimal Nonlinear Taxation: A 
Note, April 2008 
 
2270 Gary E. Bolton, Claudia Loebbecke and Axel Ockenfels, How Social Reputation 
Networks Interact with Competition in Anonymous Online Trading: An Experimental 
Study, April 2008 
 
2271 Nikolaus Wolf, Scylla and Charybdis. Explaining Europe’s Exit from Gold, January 
1928 – December 1936, April 2008 
 
  
2272 Michael Funke and Marc Gronwald, The Undisclosed Renminbi Basket: Are the 
Markets Telling us something about where the Renminbi – US Dollar Exchange Rate is 
Going?, April 2008 
 
2273 Thor Olav Thoresen and Annette Alstadsæter, Shifts in Organizational Form under a 
Dual Income Tax System, April 2008 
 
2274 Helge Berger and Volker Nitsch, Too many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy, 
April 2008 
 
2275 Yin-Wong Cheung and Eiji Fujii, Deviations from the Law of One Price in Japan, April 
2008 
 
2276 Michael S. Michael, Sajal Lahiri and Panos Hatzipanayotou, Integrated Reforms of 
Indirect Taxes in the Presence of Pollution, April 2008 
 
2277 Bas Jacobs, Is Prescott Right? Welfare State Policies and the Incentives to Work, Learn 
and Retire, April 2008 
 
2278 Burkhard Heer and Alfred Maußner, Value Function Iteration as a Solution Method for 
the Ramsey Model, April 2008 
 
2279 Jarko Fidrmuc and Christa Hainz, Integrating with their Feet: Cross-Border Lending at 
the German-Austrian Border, April 2008 
 
2280 Kristof Dascher and Alexander Haupt, The Political Economy of Regional Integration 
Projects at Borders where Rich and Poor Meet: The Role of Cross-Border Shopping and 
Community Sorting, April 2008 
 
2281 Katrin Assenmacher-Wesche and M. Hashem Pesaran, A VECX* Model of the Swiss 
Economy, April 2008 
 
2282 Christophe Rault, Robert Sova and Ana Maria Sova, Modeling International Trade 
Flows between CEEC and OECD Countries, April 2008 
 
2283 Timo Boppart, Josef Falkinger, Volker Grossmann, Ulrich Woitek and Gabriela 
Wüthrich, Qualifying Religion: The Role of Plural Identities for Educational 
Production, April 2008 
 
2284 Armin Falk, David Huffman and W. Bentley MacLeod, Institutions and Contract 
Enforcement, April 2008 
 
2285 Axel Dreher and Stefan Voigt, Does Membership in International Organizations 
Increase Governments’ Credibility? Testing the Effects of Delegating Powers, April 
2008 
 




2287 Regina Dionisius, Samuel Muehlemann, Harald Pfeifer, Günter Walden, Felix 
Wenzelmann and Stefan C. Wolter, Cost and Benefit of Apprenticeship Training – A 
Comparison of Germany and Switzerland, April 2008 
 
2288 Francesco Daveri and Cecilia Jona-Lasinio, Off-Shoring and Productivity Growth in the 
Italian Manufacturing Industries, April 2008 
 
2289 Mikael Priks, Do Surveillance Cameras Affect Unruly Behavior? A Close Look at 
Grandstands, April 2008 
 
2290 Marianna Belloc and Daniela Federici, A Two-Country NATREX Model for the 
Euro/Dollar, April 2008 
 
2291 Nicolas Treich, The Value of a Statistical Life under Ambiguity Aversion, April 2008 
 
2292 J. Atsu Amegashie, Socially-Tolerable Discrimination, April 2008 
 
2293 M. Hashem Pesaran and Andreas Pick, Forecasting Random Walks Under Drift 
Instability, April 2008 
 
2294 Steven Brakman, Gus Garita, Harry Garretsen and Charles van Marrewijk, Unlocking 
the Value of Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions, May 2008 
 
2295 Eric O’N. Fisher and Kathryn G. Marshall, The Structure of the American Economy, 
May 2008 
 
2296 Claudia M. Buch and Martin Schlotter, Regional Origins of Employment Volatility: 
Evidence from German States, May 2008 
 
2297 Helmuth Cremer, Philippe De Donder, Dario Maldonado and Pierre Pestieau, Taxing 
Sin Goods and Subsidizing Health Care, May 2008 
 
2298 Reinhilde Veugelers and Frederick van der Ploeg, Reforming European Universities: 
Scope for an Evidence-Based Process, May 2008 
 
2299 Jon H. Fiva and Lars J. Kirkebøen, Does the Housing Market React to New Information 
on School Quality?, May 2008 
 
2300 Tina Klautke and Alfons J. Weichenrieder, Interest Income Tax Evasion, the EU 
Savings Directive, and Capital Market Effects, May 2008 
 
2301 Harald Badinger and Peter Egger, GM Estimation of Higher Order Spatial 
Autoregressive Processes in Panel Data Error Component Models, May 2008 
 
2302 Jan K. Brueckner, Slot-Based Approaches to Airport Congestion Management, May 
2008 
 
2303 Sören Blomquist, Vidar Christiansen and Luca Micheletto, Public Provision of Private 
Goods and Nondistortionary Marginal Tax Rates, May 2008 
  
2304 Dan Anderberg and Alessandro Balestrino, The Political Economy of Post-Compulsory 
Education Policy with Endogenous Credit Constraints, May 2008 
 
2305 Tomer Blumkin, Yoram Margalioth and Efraim Sadka, The Role of Stigma in the 
Design of Welfare Programs, May 2008 
 
2306 Vesa Kanniainen and Paolo M. Panteghini, Tax Neutrality: Illusion or Reality? The 
Case of Entrepreneurship, May 2008 
 
2307 Thomas Dohmen, Armin Falk, David Huffman and Uwe Sunde, The Intergenerational 
Transmission of Risk and Trust Attitudes, May 2008 
 
2308 Guglielmo Maria Caporale and Mario Cerrato, Using Chebyshev Polynomials to 
Approximate Partial Differential Equations, May 2008 
 
2309 Peter Egger and Doina Maria Radulescu, Labour Taxation and Foreign Direct 
Investment, May 2008 
 
2310 Laurent Linnemer, Dissipative Advertising Signals Quality even without Repeat 
Purchases, May 2008 
 
2311 Jordi Jofre-Monseny and Albert Solé-Ollé, Which Communities should be afraid of 
Mobility? The Effects of Agglomeration Economies on the Sensitivity of Firm Location 
to Local Taxes, May 2008 
 
2312 Andreas Haufler and Ferdinand Mittermaier, Unionisation Triggers Tax Incentives to 
Attract Foreign Direct Investment, May 2008 
 
2313 Ronel Elul and Piero Gottardi, Bankruptcy: Is it enough to Forgive or must we also 
Forget?, May 2008 
 
2314 Andreas Irmen and Johanna Kuehnel, Productive Government Expenditure and 
Economic Growth, May 2008 
 
2315 Beate Henschel, Carsten Pohl and Marcel Thum, Demographic Change and Regional 
Labour Markets: The Case of Eastern Germany, May 2008 